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CAVEAT EMPTOR TO STRICT LIABILITY: ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Emanuel Emrocb
HE development of the law of products liability is historically re-
lated to industrial growth, business and economic expansion, and
the growing demand over the years for consumer protection. As the
industrial system has come of age and man has begun to make excur-
sions into outer space, the ancient principle of caveat emptor-"let the
buyer beware"-has been significantly changed in favor of the con-
sumer.' As we emerged from the ancient mercantile society, where the
seller and buyer usually met and bargained, to an impersonal market
characterized by corporate organization, industrial and technological ad-
vancement and complexity, and sophisticated marketing and finance, the
law changed in response to the new circumstances. Although the shift
from caveat emptor to the promulgation of judicial and legislative rules,
safeguards and standards, enlarging the legal rights of the buyer and
consumer, came slowly and irregularly in the United States, greater
strides have been made in the development of products liability law in the
last decade than were made in the entire preceding century. This
greater advance can be accounted for by the scientific and economic
explosion following World War II and by the greater concern
and emphasis being placed on human loss and injury resulting from
defective products than on commercial loss suffered by the buyer.
Member of the Virginia Bar. B.A, Richmond, 1928; LL.B, Richmond, 1931. The
author is grateful to J. Durwood Felton III, second-year student, T. C. Williams School
of Law, for his research and helpful assistance in the preparation of this article.
I Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958).
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The restrictions on the right of recovery by the injured consumer
or user often stemmed from the limitations fixed in the law of sales and
contracts. These limitations were somewhat relaxed in the early stages
of the common law by the creation of warranty devices and rules, which
were in the nature of an express warranty given at the time of sale and
a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which the law implied as
part of the bargain when goods were ordered in advance of manufac-
ture and the buyer relied upon the seller.' Later came the implied war-
ranty of merchantability that the goods were fit for their general and
ordinary purposes. Problems arising from the underlying sales contract,
such as lack of privity, reliance and disclaimer, continued to confront
the ultimate consumer and user in his effort to seek compensation for his
injuries and loss in negligence and warranty cases. Many of these ob-
stacles have been overcome by decisional and statutory rules, thus allow-
ing recovery against remote vendors and manufacturers who were im-
mune from direct action until recent times.
Numerous exceptions have been made by the courts to overcome the
stringent rule of non-liability of the manufacturer to the remote vendee
or user in both food and non-food products liability cases based on negli-
gence; warranty rules have been enlarged and the assault upon the privity
wall has continued unabated.3 In very recent times, what Dean Prosser
calls the most rapid and spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts4 has taken place in the acceptance of
the doctrine of strict liability in tort. This latter doctrine eliminates
privity as a requirement in actions for damages and severs the rules of
sales and contracts from the tort aspects in the determination of the
issues of the defectiveness of the product and the proximate cause of any
injury or loss suffered by the consumer, user or person affected by such
product. The law has progressed to the socio-economic consideration
2 It is interesting to note that the court in Gerst v. Jones & Co., 73 Va. (32 Gratt.)
518, 527 (1879), quoting from Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, stated that the rule of
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose "is of great importance, because
it will teach manufacturers that they must not undersell each other by producing
goods of inferior quality, and that the law will protect purchasers who are necessarily
ignorant of the commodity sold."
3 Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Priuity Requirement in Products Liability Cases,
48 VA. L. REv. 982 (1962). The public demand for greater consumer protection with
regard to food, drugs and other articles unquestionably influenced the Virginia
General Assembly in its decision to give favorable approval to a recent statute dispens-
ing with the privity requirement. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
4 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966).
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that the risk of loss from a defective product should be on the party who
is in the best position to stand such loss.5
NEGLIGENCE AND WARRANTY LIABILITY IN FOOD CASES
Historically in Virginia, an injured consumer has been permitted a
tort action against the manufacturer for negligence in marketing and
selling unfit and unwholesome food and drink, even in the absence of
privity between such manufacturer and consumer. In Norfolk Coca-
Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Krausse,6 the court held that the consumer
could sue the bottling company for personal injuries suffered as a result
of swallowing glass contained in a bottled product which was put on the
market by the defendant and purchased from a retail grocer by the
plaintiff. A prima facie case of negligence was established by the plain-
tiff when proof was offered that foreign substances were contained in a
bottle which had not been tampered with since leaving the possession
of the bottling company. In subsequent cases the court followed the
doctrine that one who sells foodstuffs for human consumption is liable
for failure to use reasonable and due care in the preparation and handling
of his product.7 Thus, Virginia was not concerned with the absence of
privity in negligence actions in food cases.
In actions based on breach of warranty of fitness of food, the
injured purchaser, until recently, could only seek recovery against
his immediate seller, since the absence of privity blocked an action
against others in the chain of distribution. Likewise, if the consumer or
user was not a buyer, he was barred from maintaining any action on
implied warranty. Although it recognized both the modern concept
that from the sale of food for immediate domestic use there arises, as be-
tveen the dealer and the consumer, an implied warranty that such food is
wholesome and fit to be eaten, and a public policy of consumer protec-
tion and promotion of public health in implying such warranty, the court
5See W. PaossER, Tim LAw OF TORTS § 74, 508 (3d ed. 1964).
0162 Va. 107, 173 S.E. 497 (1934).
7 Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis, 163 Va. 89, 175 S.E. 743 (1934) (glass in a can of
pork and beans); Middlesboro Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Campbell, 179 Va.
693, 20 SZE.2d 479 (1942) (deleterious matter in a bottled product); Norfolk Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, Inc. v. Land, 189 Va. 35, 52 S.E.2d 85 (1949) (worm in a drink
product); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. McCullers, 189 Va. 89, 52 S.E.2d 257 (1949)
(mouse and other obnoxious matter in a bottled product); Newport News Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Babb, 190 Va. 360, 57 S.E2d 41 (1950) (snail or slug in a bottled
product).
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in Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co.8 denied recovery to an infant plaintiff
who became ill from Malta Fever germs in bottled milk which his father
had purchased from the defendant processor-retailer. The decision was
based on an absence of privity of contract between the infant and the
retailer. In Kroger Grocery Co. v. Dunn the plaintiff was allowed re-
covery on an implied warranty by the retailer with whom he was in
privity and from whom the plaintiff had purchased food in an unsealed
package. Such implied warranty was again recognized by the court in
the later case of Brockett v. Harrell Brothers, Inc.,0 in which it was held
that the plaintiff, who was injured by biting on buckshot imbedded in
ham sold in an unsealed package by the defendant retailer, could recover
from the retailer for breach of implied warranty of fitness of the product.
In Blythe v. Camp Manufacturing Co." the court reserved for future
determination whether a retailer who sells unwholesome food or bev-
erages for human consumption is liable to the purchaser for the conse-
quences of a breach of implied warranty, when such food or beverages
are resold in the original sealed containers bearing the label of a reputa-
ble manufacturer. However, the United States District Court, applying
Virginia law, forecast that the Virginia court would extend a warranty
of wholesomeness to the retail sale of cosmetics in a sealed package.' 2
Twenty-three years after Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co.,13 the lia-
bility of a manufacturer to the consumer for injury from contaminated
food sold in a sealed container was clearly enunciated by the Virginia
court in the leading case of S'wift & Co. v. Wells.14 The manufacturer
was held liable on an implied warranty of wholesomeness, despite a lack
of privity between it and the consumer, the court basing its decision on
sound public policy principles recognized in Colonna. In a case involv-
ing a similar warranty of fitness of food, the court in Brockett v. Harrell
Bros., Inc.15 found that a processor of meat, who was joined with the
retailer, could be held liable in the absence of privity,16 even though the
8 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936).
9 181 Va. 390, 25 S.E.2d 254 (1943).
10 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965).
11183 Va. 432, 32 S.E.2d 659 (1945).
12 Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, 106 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1952).
13 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936).
14 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
15 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965).
M Privity had been abolished in Virginia by statute when this decision was rendered.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
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package had been opened and the product repackaged by the retailer.
The court in Swift, by decisional creativity, extended the doctrine of
warranty liability without privity, but in two subsequent non-food
cases the court rejected the assaults upon the privity doctrine in actions
based on negligence and warranty.17
LIABiLnY FoR NEGLIGENCE IN NoN-FooD CASES
In 1961 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia spoke out on the
right of a consumer or user to sue the manufacturer for negligence in a
non-food products liability case. In General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos'8
the court held that unless the manufactured product was inherently
dangerous,19 a remote vendee could not recover for negligence in the
absence of privity of contract between the parties. In all other cases a
consumer, user or remote vendee would be barred from maintaining
an action against the manufacturer or one with whom the injured party
was not in privity. In General Bronze a motel owner sued the manu-
facturer for negligence in the design and construction of sliding glass
doors which were installed in the rooms of the motel, and it was held
that there was nothing inherently dangerous about such doors.
It had been indicated both before and after MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.20 that the Virginia court was giving some consideration to
the MacPherson rule, which established the "imminently dangerous" ex-
ception to the privity doctrine that "[i]f the nature of a thing is such
that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negli-
gently made, it is then a thing of danger." 20a Twelve years before the
decision in MacPherson, the Virginia court in Standard Oil Co. v. Wake-
field's Administrator 1 had intimated that Virginia had adopted the "im-
minently dangerous" rule in permitting the administrator of a deceased
servant of a consignee to sue the shipper for negligence, although no
privity of contract existed between the shipper and such servant. The
article involved was naptha, commonly recognized as a dangerous sub-
stance. The court said that liability does not depend upon privity of
contract, but on the duty of every person to so use his own property as
17 General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E.2d (1961); Harris v.
Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471 (1961).
18 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E.2d 548 (1961).
'o "A product is inherently dangerous when the danger of injury stems from the
product itself, and not from any defect in it." Id. at 70, 122 S.E.2d at 551.
20 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
20a Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
21 102 Va. 824, 47 S.E. 830 (1904).
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not to injure the persons or property of others, and that a person who
negligently uses a dangerous instrument, or causes or authorizes its use by
another in such a manner or under such circumstances that he has rea-
son to know it is likely to produce injury, is responsible for the natural
and probable consequences of his act. It has been questioned whether the
actual holding in Wakefield's Administrator reflected the modern rule of
MacPherson, or only the law with respect to an inherently dangerous
product,22 since the court decided the case on the broad theories of
proximate cause and foreseeability.
In Robey v. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works2 3 the court set
forth, without adopting, two exceptions to the general rule of non-lia-
bility of the manufacturer to the consumer or user in the absence
of privity of contract. The first exception was quoted from Cooley
on Torts and provided that a person who knowingly sells or
furnishes an article which by reason of defective construction, or other-
wise, is imminently dangerous to life or property, without notice or
warning of the defect or danger, is liable to third persons who suffer
therefrom. This exception was limited to failure to warn the consumer
or user of any defects known to the manufacturer or seller upon the
sale of an article. In referring to the second exception, the Robey court
stated that "beginning with the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., . . . the recent cases have enlarged the liability of a manufacturer
to a remote vendee to include articles not inherently dangerous and not
dangerous when properly constructed and put to their intended use,
which if defectively constructed may reasonably be anticipated to cause
injury to those properly using them." 24 Although the Robey court
declined to adopt any such exceptions to the general rule of non-lia-
bility, considering them inapplicable to the solution of the factual situ-
ation of that case, the opinion recognized the broadening concepts in
the field of products liability and the erosion of the general rule of non-
liability.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pierce v. Ford Motor Co.25
thought that the decision in Robey anticipated Virginia's ap-
proval of the MacPherson rule and rejected the contention that the doc-
trine of that case was not the law of Virginia .2  The court quoted the
22See Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability
Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982, 983 n. 5, 984 n. 9 (1962).
23 192 Va. 192, 64 S.E.2d 723 (1951).
24 Id. at 196-97, 64 S.E.2d at 726.
25 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
26 In Pierce the court said: "And we are not impressed with the argument that the
[Vol. 4:1I55
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Cooley and MacPherson exceptions from the opinion in Robey, and also
stated that the Virginia court in Standard Oil Co. v. Wakefield's Ad-
ministrator27 had laid down the general principle upon which the Mac-
Pherson case and those following it were founded.
McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp.28 involved the de-
foliation of trees resulting from the application of a newly perfected
scab eradicant then being marketed in Virginia for the first time. The
court adopted and applied the exception to the general rule that the
manufacturer who knowingly sells a product which, by reason of de-
fective construction or otherwise, is imminently dangerous 9 to life or
property, and who gives neither adequate notice nor warning of such
defect or danger, is liable for any injury resulting therefrom. This is
the same exception quoted by the court in Robey. In McClanahan the
court found that the manufacturer of the spray was liable because of
its failure to warn of circumstances which it could have reasonably an-
ticipated.80
The struggle by the courts to determine the liability of the manufac-
turer or seller in the absence of privity, and which exceptions, if any,
to adopt, and whether the exceptions were swallowing the gen-
eral rule of non-liability ended in Virginia in 1962 with the statutory
abrogation of privity as a defense.31
IMPLIED WARRANTY LIABILITY IN NoN-FooD CASES
A. Fitness For a Particular Purpose
The doctrine of implied warranty was resisted as an innovation sought
to be borrowed from the civil law until the early part of the nineteenth
doctrine of that case [MacPherson] is not the law of Virginia merely because in the
recent case of Robey v. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 192 Va. 192, 64 S.E.2d
723, 726, the Supreme Court of Appeals of that state assumed without deciding that
its doctrine was applicable. The reasoning of the court clearly indicates its approval of
the rule in the following passage of its opinion ... 2 Id. at 914.
27 102 Va. 824, 47 S.E. 830 (1904).
28 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
2o The court in McClanahan spoke of "potentially dangerous" and may have intended
to use that phrase synonymously with "imminently dangerous," although "potentially
dangerous" more clearly defines a product which may have been perfectly constructed
but has a potential to cause injury when used in an anticipated manner without warning
by the manufacturer.
80 See generally Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty
to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). Cf. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79
(4th Cir. 1962).
81 VA. CODE A~m. § 8.2-318 (1965).
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century, and until that time the common law rule of caveat emptor
was maintained in all its integrity.32 However, implied warranties under
some circumstances were recognized by the courts and accepted as part
of the common law. Thus, upon a sale by sample there was an implied
warranty that the bulk of the goods corresponded in quality with the
sample. In the case of an executory contract of sale, where the goods
were ordered for a particular use or purpose known to the seller, he
impliedly undertook that such goods would be reasonably fit for the use
or purposes for which they were intended. Such implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose attached only when the buyer, in reliance
upon the seller, described a particular use he had for some undescribed
and unascertained product, and the seller then undertook to provide a
product. In most cases the courts held the rationale for the rule to be
that the buyer relied on the judgment or skill of the manufacturer, dealer
or seller that the product would be reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it was to be used. 8 When the purchase was of a known, de-
scribed and definite product, the seller performed his part of the con-
tract by delivering the product, and in the absence of fraud or some
positive affirmation amounting to an express warranty, he was not liable
for a defect in the quality of such product. Under such circumstances
the purchaser, in selecting the particular product, relied upon his own
judgment and assumed the risk of it being suitable for his own pur-
poses.
Although the foregoing summary of the early history of implied
warranty in Virginia is mainly structured in the context of the law of
sales rather than products liability, Virginia had occasion to consider a
products liability situation in Gerst v. Jones & Co.34 This is perhaps
the first case decided in Virginia applying the rule of implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose. The manufacturer agreed to furnish
to the plaintiff, during the manufacturing season, as many wooden to-
bacco boxes as the plaintiff required. The plaintiff pressed its tobacco
in these boxes and, because unseasoned timber was used in making the
boxes, the tobacco placed therein became moulded. The plaintiff relied
upon the defendant to select and use proper box material and timber
and to make the necessary tests to determine whether the boxes were
made of seasoned or dry timber. It was shown that it was not customary
32 Mason v. Chappell, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 572 (1860).
33 Id.; Gerst v. Jones & Co., 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 518 (1879); Universal Motor Co. v.
Snow, 149 Va. 690, 140 S.E. 653 (1927).
3473 Va. (32 Gratt.) 518 (1879).
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for tobacco manufacturers to subject the boxes furnished them by box
manufacturers to any tests. The court held that the box manufacturer
was liable to the plaintiff for injury to the tobacco for breach of its im-
plied warranty.35 Gerst involved economic loss based upon strict lia-
bility for breach of warranty.
On the basis of breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose, the court in Swersky v. Higgins36 allowed recovery
against a contractor for damages to the plaintiff's home after the appli-
cation of a paint-like material. The liability of the contractor was held
to be the same as that of a manufacturer or a seller.
The common law rule of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose has remained unchanged since its first recognition in Virginia,37
and its statutory counterpart has been included in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, as adopted in Virginia,38 without any major change.39
B. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
In Virginia there had been no definite acceptance of the concept of
implied warranty of merchantability40 until 1961 when the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in Smith v. Hensley41 engrafted such war-
ranty upon the fabric of the Virginia law.42 In Smith v. Hensley43 the
court held that where the buyer ordered from the seller by its trade
name a product which had but one general purpose, namely, to be used
as a roof coating, there was an implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness of the product for the ordinary or general purpose for which it
was sold. Thus, there was a definitive acceptance of this warranty for
the first time in Virginia.
35!d.
36 194 Va. 983, 76 S.E.2d 200 (1953).
37See H. M. Gleason & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 SE.2d
904 (1955); E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Universal Moulded Products Corp., 191
Va. 525, 62 S.E.2d 233 (1950); Greenland Dev. Corp. v. Allied Heating Products Co.,
184 Va. 588, 35 S.E.2d 801 (1945); Universal Motor Co. v. Snow, 149 Va. 690, 140
S.E. 653 (1927); Standard Paint Co. v. E. K. Vietor & Co., 120 Va. 595, 91 SE. 752
(1917); Gersr v. Jones & Co., 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 518 (1879). See also 32 VA. L. REv.
679 (1946).
3 8 VA. CODE ANw. § 8.2-315 (1965).
39 See the Virginia comment to VA. CODE ANN. § 82-315 (1965).
4 0 Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145 Va. 448, 134 SE. 588 (1926).
41202 Va. 700, 119 S.E.2d 332 (1961).
42 For a discussion of the nature and origin of the warranty, see Comment, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantability-Smith v. Hensley, 48 VA. L. REv. 152 (1962).
48 202 Va. 700, 119 S.E2d 332 (1961).
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In Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractors & Equipment Co.,44 the
existence of an implied warranty of merchantability was recognized,
but the decision turned on the theory that privity 5 was required for
recovery based on implied warranty by an employee in a personal in-
jury action against the seller of a tagline to the plaintiff's employer.
The court stated that the then prevailing view was that there could be
no recovery against the manufacturer or seller of the product alleged
to have caused the injury, on the theory of breach of warranty, where
there was no privity of contract between the injured party and the
manufacturer or seller. The rule enunciated in Harris was changed by
the statutory elimination of the necessity for privity in warranty actions
in Virginia.4"
Unlike the rule of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
reliance is not an essential element under the implied warranty of mer-
chantability.4 7 Under the Uniform Commercial Code the implied war-
ranty of merchantability encompasses the warranty of wholesomeness
of food.4 8
ABROGATION OF PRIVITY IN VIRGINIA
After Stwift, Harris and General Bronze, Virginia in 1962 by statute
abrogated the requirement of privity in all products liability cases
brought against a manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages
for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence. 9 Vir-
ginia was the first state to adopt such broad statutory provisions. The
statute makes no distinction between food and non-food cases:
44 202 Va. 958, 121 S2E.2d 471 (1961).
45The official text of the Uniform Commercial Code extends the seller's warranty
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer, or who is a
guest in his home, if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods, and who is injured by breach of the warranty.
46VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
47 Smith v. Hensley, 202 Va. 700, 119 S.E.2d 332 (1961).
4 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-314 (1965). The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has had
occasion since Smith and Harris to consider tangentially the implied warranty of
merchantability. See Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969)
(holding that the statute of limitations in implied warranty cases runs from the date
of injury); Freidman v. Peoples Service Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160 SE.2d
563 (1968) (holding two year personal injury statute of limitations to be applicable in
an implied warranty case); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897
(1965) (involving wholesomeness of food).
49 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965) (formerly included as § 8-654.3).
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Lack of privity between the-plaintiff and defendant shall be no de-
fense in any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods
to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for
negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the
defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or
seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods; however, this section shall not be construed to affect
any litigation pending at its effective date.50
Thus, the wall of privity which had theretofore prevented the sub-pur-
chaser from suing the manufacturer and the non-purchaser from suing
the retailer or manufacturer was completely removed.r1
Under the statute it is not necessary in a non-food negligence case to
establish whether a product is inherently or imminently dangerous in
order to effect a recovery, since the hurdle of privity has been abolished.
The right of action in negligence cases is extended to all those persons
whom the manufacturer or seller "might reasonably have expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods."
In providing that "lack of privity shall be no defense," the statute im-
plicitly extends the implied warranty of merchantability from the
manufacturer and seller to any person within the foreseeable class. The
Virginia court has said that the obvious purpose of the statute is to in-
sure the implied warranty of fitness by the manufacturer to the con-
sumer, despite the lack of privity between the tvo. 5 2
The statute also abrogates privity as an essential element in an action
in which the plaintiff relies upon an express warranty, which is now
extended to foreseeable users, consumers, and those who may be af-
fected by the goods.
It had been suggested that since the statute stripped warranty of its
contractual aspect, an action for breach of warranty sounded in tort.
However, the court in Brockett v. Harrell Brothers, inc.53 held that in ac-
tions for damages for the sale of unwholesome foodstuffs based on breach
of implied warranty of fitness, Virginia has consistently regarded such
actions as being ex contractu. The court went on to hold that contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff would not be material on the issue of the
defendant's breach of implied warranty of fitness.
50 Id.
51 Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability
Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982, 985 (1962).
52 Brockett v. Harrell Bros, Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965).
53 Id. at 463, 143 S.E.2d at 902.
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In 1964 the General Assembly of Virginia adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, which became effective on January 1, 1966. The
anti-privity statute of Virginia was included in lieu of the official text of
the Code, which only provided for a limited abrogation of privity.
It was never intended, when the original statute was first adopted in
1962, that its provisions should be locked in the Uniform Commercial
Code and that the right of recovery in personal injury actions should be
restricted and hampered by rules of sales, contract and commercial trap-
pings."4 In comparing the broadening concept of strict liability within
the framework of the Uniform Commercial Code, as evidenced by the
inclusion therein of the statute abrogating the privity requirement, and
the approach of strict products liability in tort as covered by section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it was suggested prior to
the effective date of the Code that at that stage in the development of
strict products liability, the Virginia approach of including the anti-
privity statute in the Code was preferable." At this post-Code juncture
in the development of the law of products liability in actions for dam-
ages resulting from personal injury, some concern has arisen as to
whether it would have been better procedure in Virginia not to have
included the anti-privity statute in the Uniform Commercial Code and
simply not to have adopted any section 2-318 of the Code.56 There
would seem to be much validity to this suggestion since the anti-
privity statute covers negligence as well as warranty, and the Code is
neither a legislative enactment nor a set of ground rules for personal
injury actions resulting from defective products.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
In the past decade important advances in consumer protection in Vir-
ginia have provided some foundation for the development of products
54Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases,
48 VA. L. REv. 982 (1962).
Z5 Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965). The author proposes that the
judicial application of the doctrine of strict products liability should be made within
the limits of the Uniform Commercial Code and under its controlled conditions
rather than outside the Code and under broad principles of tort law. The answer to
this contention is that the fundamental reason and purpose for the creation and adop-
tion of the doctrine of strict liability in tort was to avoid the commercial aspects and
the incidental contractual nature of the product's placement on the market in an
action based on tort for personal injury, and the refusal of the courts to permit
manufacturers to define the scope of their own responsibility for defective products.
" California, in adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, did not include § 2-318,
and the development of the law of strict liability has been on a case by case basis.
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liability law in other jurisdictions.oa However, within the past five years
a number of jurisdictions have accepted the doctrine of strict liability in
tort, representing a significant departure from the contractual concepts
in products liability cases. The historical advancement in this burgeon-
ing area of the law in the United States has, within the last hundred
years, run the entire gamut from non-liability to strict liability in tort.
In the early development of products liability in America, the courts
borrowed the concept of non-liability from the English case of Winter-
bottom v. Wright,' wherein the Court of Exchequer held that breach
of a contract to keep a mail coach in repair after it was sold would give
no cause of action to the coach driver who was injured when it col-
lapsed. The case was generally understood to state a rule of non-lia-
bility of any supplier to a third party. The court then began to develop
exceptions to that general rule in order to permit recovery by persons
not in privity with the manufacturer. Perhaps the most important ex-
ception was that a manufacturer of a chattel owed a duty to an expected
user to use care to make it safe, provided the chattel was "inherently
dangerous." "Inherently dangerous" was broad enough to include food
and drink, drugs, firearms and explosives.58
In 1916 Judge Cardozo in the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.69 held that the manufacturer of an automobile who sells it
to a dealer is liable to the remote vendee, despite the absence of privity,
for any negligence in the manufacture or inspection of the vehicle.
Thus, the citadel of privity in negligence cases was felled and the lia-
bility of manufacturers of chattels to third persons was based on general
principles of negligence. The MacPherson rule placed an affirmative
duty on the manufacturer not to create unreasonable risks of bodily
harm to those within the area of risk or foreseeable zone of danger.
As we enter the decade of the seventies, MacPherson is now probably
accepted by most American jurisdictions, either by decisional or statu-
Goa See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961);
ARK. STATS. 1965, Act 35.
57 152 Eng. Rep. 402, (Ex. 1842).
68 See, e.g., Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 F. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1918) (loaded
air rifle); Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918)
(human toe in plug of chewing tobacco); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852)
(defendant negligently mislabeled belladonna, a poison, as extract of dandelion and
was held liable to plaintiff consumer despite absence of privity on the grounds that
there must be an exception to the rule of nonliability where article sold is "inherently
dangerous to life and health"); Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S.W. 576
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (soap containing poisonous ingredient).
59 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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tory rule.60 This germinal rule has been extended to include property
damage,0' the protection of employees, members of their family, and
other users of the chattel, as well as casual bystanders and others "in the
vicinity of its probable use." 62 The rule has also been extended to
makers of component parts, assemblers, sellers who put their names on
goods made by others,63 and those who give their approval to the design
of the product.64
Paralleling the development and acceptance of the concept of re-
sponsibility for negligent conduct, but lacking the same rapidity, has
00 See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
suner), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Within the last ten years, Virginia and Mississippi
have enbraced the MacPherson rule.
91 See Brown v. Bigelow, 325 Mass. 4, 88 N.E.2d 542 (1949) (harm to cows from
defective feed); Genessee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons,
263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934) (harm to a farm resulting from failure to warn
of flammability of waterproofing compound); Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn.
App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954) (harm to horses from unfit feed).
62 Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (manufacturer liable
for negligence in giving insufficient warning of danger of furniture polish which resulted
in an infant's death); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (passenger
in car lost eye when thrown against jagged ashtray in car manufactured by defend-
ant); Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (manufac-
turer of bus liable for passenger injury and death caused by defective design); Reed &
Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cit. 1934) (social guest injured by defective coffee
urn); State ex rel. Woodzel v. Garzell Plastics Indus., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich.
1957) (recovery for death of occupant of boat from hull manufacturer); Beadles v.
Servel, Inc., 344 IIl. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) (carbon monoxide gas given off by
a refrigerator); Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923)
(employee of corporate vendee killed by explosion of electric transformers as a result of
failure to warn employer that defendant had shipped transformers with wooden blocks
packed inside); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633
(1927) (manufacturer liable to child for injury caused by failure to inspect sewing
machine plug); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928) (recon-
ditioner of automobile liable to pedestrian who was struck because vehicle had bad
brakes).
03 Block v. Urban, 166 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (anodizer of aluminum hunt-
ing bow liable for loss of eye of remote vendee); Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 168 Cal.
App. 2d 429, 336 P.2d 286 (1959) (defective metal ring incorporated into safety belt
made by another resulting in liability when oil derrickman fell to his death); Rauch v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 252 Iowa 1, 104 N.W.2d 607 (1960) (li-
ability of assembler of gas water heater); Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 406, 251
S.W.2d 635 (1952) (parts maker of valve); Smith v. Peerless Glass Co, 259 N.Y. 292,
181 N.E. 576 (1932) (leading case laying down that under MacPherson maker of com-
ponent part is in no better position than assembler of finished product; bottle maker
liable to waitress for loss of her eye when charged bottle subsequently exploded);
Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 13 Wis. 2d 173, 108 N.W.2d 149 (1961) (tire
manufacturer liable to motorist injured when defective tire blew out).
04 Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
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been the development of the concept of strict liability of the manu-
facturer and seller of chattels. Strict liability, without requiring privity
of contract, was imposed in pre-MacPherson cases involving defective
food and drink.6 The majority of American courts today impose strict
liability upon the producer or seller of defective food, despite the ab-
sence of privity or negligence.66 In the past decade the courts have gone
beyond food in non-privity cases and have applied strict warranty lia-
bility to assorted products.
The case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.68 does for war-
ranty liability what MacPherson did for negligence law in the products
field. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that breach of implied war-
ranty rendered an auto manufacturer liable for harm suffered by the
remote purchaser's wife despite the absence of privity and a disclaimer
clause.
Personal injury actions founded on breach of implied warranty of
merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose were treated before
Henningsen as sounding in contract and tort, and the courts have for
varying reasons either found privity present or have eliminated privity
as a requirement. 9 Virginia, Arkansas and Wyoming are among several
65 Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914); Jackson Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 S. 791 (1914); Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).(06 Mazoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961);
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Swift & Co. v. Wells,
201 Va. 213, 110 S:E.2d 203 (1959). The Court of Appeals of New York in Greenberg v.
Lorenz, supra, a case involving the right of an infant to recover for injuries resulting
from a metal tag in a can of salmon purchased by his father, relied upon Swift & Co.
v. Wells, supra, in holding that privity was not a requirement for recovery in implied
warranty.
07 See B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (tires);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962) (combination power tool); Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353
P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960) (grinding wheel); Continental Copper & Steel
Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1958) (electric cable);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp, 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963) (airplane). See also Lambert, Storming of the Citadel: Waning of the
Privity Rule in Implied Warranty Cases, PERSONAL INJURY ANNuAL-1963, at 533;
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Conswner), 50 MINN. L. Rav.
791 (1966).
60 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
09 See Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d
445 (1936); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928)
(purchaser of product treated as third party beneficiary); Jacob E. Decker & Sons,
Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (warranty originally tortious in
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states which have discarded the privity requirement by statutory rule.70
In other cases the courts have discarded privity and allowed a recovery
for breach of an express warranty upon proof that a false representa-
tion regarding the quality and condition of the product was made by the
manufacturer, and that as a result the ultimate purchaser suffered per-
sonal injury or physical damage.71
In recent years there has been a growing and forthright recognition
of liability as being "tortious in nature and strict in character." 72 In
1963 the California Supreme Court clearly delineated this new concept
in products liability cases in Greenman v. Yuba Po'wer Products, Inc.: 73
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufac-
turer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a con-
tract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed
by agreement but imposed by law . . . and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for de-
fective products . . . make clear that the liability is not one gov-
erned by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict lia-
bility in tort.74
This new doctrine has also been recognized by other courts.75
nature so that contractual privity is not a necessary element); Swift & Co. v. Wells,
201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959) (public policy demands elimination of the privity
requirement); 'Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929)
(retailer treated as agent of either the manufacturer or the purchaser).
70VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-318 (1963); ARK. STmTs.
1965, Act 35. The Arkansas anti-privity statute follows the Virginia enactment ver-
batim.
71See Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonan, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d
240 (1966); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); REsTATEMF.-T
(SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 402B (1965).
72 Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 9 (1965).
73 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
74 Id. at 901.
75 See Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Greeno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz.
556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 67, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d
694 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
Dealers Transport Corp. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.,V.2d 441 (Ky. 1966);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967);
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Santor v. A. & M.
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Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was
adopted in 1964, sets forth the doctrine of strict liability in tort. It
provides that the seller of "a defective product unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer" is "subject to liability" even though he has
"exercised all possible care." 75a The requirement of privity is completely
eliminated. Liability is outside the scope of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Sales Act. The requirement of notice and the
contractual aspects of disclaimer and reliance are avoided.76 The Re-
statement observes:
There is nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from
treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or con-
sumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and understood
that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty from those
usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the
various contract rules which have grown up to surround such salesY77
California adopted the Uniform Commercial Code without including
the official text of section 2-318, which limits the extension of the war-
ranty to a "person who is in the family or household" of a buyer or
"a guest in his home," thus leaving to decisional rule the responsibility
for fixing strict liability as solely in tort without regard to contract or
negligence.78
Virginia has adopted in lieu of the official text of section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code a provision eliminating the requirement
of privity in all actions against the manufacturer and seller of goods
for negligence and breach of warranty, thus allowing recovery based
upon strict liability by those persons who would reasonably be ex-
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241
Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729
(Wash. 1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
75aREsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See Caveat and Comments 1, o
and q.
76Strict liability undir Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS "is
hardly more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract
doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and limitations
through inconsistencies with express warranties." Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.,
237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
7 7 RE TATMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m.78 See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and
Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30 (1965), for a discussion of the California
cases.
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pected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. Under this statu-
tory posture, recovery for breach of warranty may not be equated with
strict liability in tort, for there may be differences in matters of proof
and defenses.79 In those states which have adopted the official text of
section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts may follow
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, or they may pro-
ceed under other common law rules in imposing strict products lia-
bility, particularly where there is any hostility toward involving sales
intricacies in tort matters. Subsequent to January 1, 1963, the effective
date of the Uniform Commercial Code in New Jersey, the highest court
of that state decided several products liability cases on the basis of the
common law principle of strict liability in tort without reference to the
Code or to the Restatement.80
Today the American courts have accepted the manufacturer's liability
to third persons for negligence. Likewise, a majority of the courts have
adopted the strict liability rule, without negligence or privity, and hold
manufacturers liable irrespective of fault in cases going beyond food
and drink. Many of the courts have adopted the doctrine of strict lia-
bility in tort as set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, and it is anticipated that in this decade a majority of the
American courts will embrace this concept.
79 Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the
Uniform Conmercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965). The author points out:
It should be emphasized that if a court or legislature has decided that products
liability does not depend upon contract or negligence, whether the new basis
for liability is called "strict liability in tort" under the Restatement of Torts
Second, or "implied warranty of merchantability" under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is relatively unimportant. In either case a duty to supply safe
products is imposed upon a class of distributors for the protection of a class
of consumers or users. The important question is whether there are substantial
differences in the scope and content of the duties imposed by section 402A
and the UCC. Until this question is answered, an intelligent decision between
the two cannot be made by any court faced with a choice. There are twojurisdictions which have already made this choice: with both states virtually
eliminating contract or negligence as conditions to liability, Virginia has elected
to impose strict products liability under the Uniform Commercial Code and
California has selected the approach of Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts Second.
Id. at 816.
80 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). "Strict liability in tort does
not mean that a manufacturer is absolutely liable for all damages proximately resulting
from the use of its product." Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RUTGERs L. REv. 692 (1965).
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CONCLUSION
Paralleling the judicial and legislative development of consumer pro-
tection in other jurisdictions, Virginia has moved forward in certain
areas of products liability law. The greatest single step was the statutory
abrogation of privity in negligence and warranty actions. The present
posture of the law permits a consumer, user, or any person who might
reasonably be affected by the goods to recover on the basis of negligence
and warranty in food and non-food cases against remote vendors and
manufacturers. Assuming for the purposes of products liability law that
common law warranties, both express and implied, exist in Virginia, in
addition to the warranties within the Uniform Commercial Code, it
would be proper to state a case within the context of either or both
such warranties. The common law warranties may not be as heavily
burdened with the intricacies of sales and contract law as those alleged
under the Code.
The Virginia court has not had occasion to determine whether the
doctrine of strict liability in tort under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts should also be permitted as a recovery route. Should
the Virginia court adopt such concept, the burden will remain on the
consumer to prove the relevant issues paramount in a products liability
case, namely defective condition and causation. The placing of the risk
of loss upon those who are better able to absorb it does not require that
the manufacturer be fortified with the wrappings of commercial law
within the judicial process.
The most recent trend in many jurisdictions has been to break com-
pletely with the encumbrances of commercial law by the adoption of
strict liability in tort. Should Virginia adopt such concept, the unfore-
seen problems which have resulted from the inclusion of the anti-privity
statute in the Uniform Commercial Code will have been resolved, and
the purpose of the original adoption of the statute will have attained frui-
tion, and the full extent of its usefulness will have been realized.
